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Foreword
The International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA) was founded in 1972 to
promote collaborative research among scholars of what was in that time called East and
West. Its founding national member organizations were from both of these regions.
The Economic Transition and Integration Project of IIASA deals with the transforma-
tion of former centrally planned economies to the market system. In its activity the project
focuses especially on the international economic relations of the transition economies and
their integration to the world economy.
Currently, ten transition economies have Association Agreements with the EU (the
so-called Europe Agreements) and each of them aims at full membership in the EU in
the near future. Four IIASA member countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech
Republic) and Slovenia have the greatest chances to begin official negotiations soon. In the
coming years, the economic policy of these Central and East European countries (CEEC)
will certainly concentrate on fulfilling the requirements for EU membership.
While research on EU accession has become intense, no or very few research projects
encourage interaction among the countries that aspire to EU membership. Based on
these considerations, IIASA has initiated a series of seminars that promotes the exchange
of views and understanding among the transition countries aspiring to EU membership.
In this project entitled The Process of EU Accession — Preparation by Learning and Ex-
change IIASA can also induce the utilization of recent experiences of those IIASA member
countries that joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden). The organization of
these seminars can also benefit from the research results of the Economic Transition and
Integration Project of IIASA that accrued since it began in 1990.
This paper summarizes the results of the first seminar in this series entitled Strength
and Advantages of Eastern Europe: EU’s Net Gains from Accession.
The underlying idea of the seminar was the following. The East European applicant
nations must clarify their position before starting negotiations about EU membership
conditions. There is a widespread superficial view on EU enlargement according to which
the new members only bring burden and additional costs for incumbent members. This is
obviously not true: new members will add new qualities to the union in various dimensions.
Helping to make East European applicants aware of their strength and weaknesses in the
context of EU membership would certainly contribute to a smoother accession process.
Moreover, the net benefits of enlargement should be viewed not only in terms of economics,
but in a wider sense: issues such as political security, the quality of the natural environment
should also be taken into account.
The seminar Strength and Advantages of Eastern Europe: EU’s Net Gains from Ac-
cession was held at IIASA, Laxenburg on 5–7 December, 1996. Participants came from
many countries but most of them were experts from five applicant countries: the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (see the Appendices for the program
and list of participants of the workshop). This report summarizes the presentations and
discussions of the workshop. The organizers of the workshop hope that with the distribu-
tion of this report more scholars, policy makers and experts will deliberate and discuss the
net benefits and advantages associated with the EU’s enlargement, and IIASA’s initiative
to enhance cooperation among applicant countries will get more support.
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The report is structured as follows: the first section summarizes the most recent de-
velopments in the accession process of CEEC.
The second section provides a summary about different quantifiable benefits from the
setting up and enlargement of integrations. This section also presents the recent trends
in trade between the EU and CEEC. It shows that the initial fears of fully different
specialization patterns in the two regions do not seem to be confirmed; rather, we can see
that trade among EU member states and with the CEEC is becoming more similar. A
significant feature of the relations among member states of the EU is the growing share of
services trade. The CEEC may therefore expect a fast development of the service sector in
trade during and after the accession to the EU. The last contribution in section 2 analyzes
the comparable development observed after Spain’s accession to the EU.
The third section provides a comparison of competitiveness between the EU as rep-
resented by Austria and the CEEC. The development of capital flows following accession
may bring a crucial change for both old and new members. A possible scenario of surge in
capital inflows following accession is analyzed in the subsequent subsection on the example
of Spain.
Section 4 focuses on agriculture. Due to the sensitivity of agriculture in the member
states of the EU and the CEEC, the integration of Eastern and Western European agri-
culture is often seen as the hardest problem for the enlargement. This section analyzes
the possible approaches to reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU
and its consequences for the new members.
Section 5 presents the relationship between environmental policy and EU enlargement.
Currently, the proposal for integration of the CEEC into the EU is the strongest incentive
for improving environmental standards.
Section 6 deals with policy and security issues, and section 7 is devoted to the general
policy initiative needed to arrange successful negotiations for the enlargement process.
Section 8 provides a brief summary.
This report was originally written by Jarko Fidrmuc and subsequently edited and
complemented by Ja´nos Ga´cs.
Some Abbreviations
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy
CEEC: Central and Eastern European Countries
CMEA: Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
EFTA: European Free Trade Agreement
EU: European Union. We do not use different abbreviations for European
Community (EC) and European Union (EU). If nothing else is mentioned,
we apply the EU12 and EU15 regional definitions before and after 1995,
respectively.
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GSP: General System of Preferences
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
RCA: Revealed Comparative Advantage
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Strength and Advantages of Eastern Europe —
EU’s Net Gains from Accession
Jarko Fidrmuc (fidrmuc@ihssv.wsr.ac.at)
1 Latest Developments in the Process of Accession —
Updates from the Applicant Countries
In 1996, the most important developments were very similar in each CEEC. The question-
naire of the EU was the most important issue in the progress of the accession, since all
CEEC had to prepare answers to the questionnaire. In the discussions at the workshop
it was pointed out that the CEEC had to answer the questionnaire in a shorter period
(within three months) than the EU needed for the preparation of these questionnaires
(namely five months).
The preparation of the answers contributed significantly to the national analysis of the
impact of the accession on the CEEC. Many details of the accession had to be taken into
account including the preparation of experts for the negotiations and clarifying relations
to other East European countries that will not join the EU in the first wave of the enlarge-
ment. In particular, the CEEC already formulated their proposal for the time schedule of
the accession (see section 1.2) below.
In economic development, the CEEC showed also similar features. Growth in the
CEEC was strong, except for Hungary. On the other hand, the problems on the monetary
side (inflation) are more persistent than expected. The slowdown of the development in
Germany and other EU member states is mirrored in the growing trade deficit of the
CEEC. Increasing trade balance and current account deficits, however, could be covered
by capital inflows. The high rate of capital inflows made sterilization necessary in all
CEEC.
1.1 Czech Republic1
Currently the main goal of the Czech economic policy is the country’s integration into
the EU; this goal is shared by all Czech political parties without major differences. An
important step towards the accession was the preparation of answers to the questionnaire
of the European Union that the Czech Republic finished in the summer of 1996. The
answers prepared by the Czech government concentrated on the gains and losses following
from the accession. Currently, the most important problems seem to be the harmonization
of laws and norms with the legal system of the EU.
The priorities of the Czech Republic are located in three areas:
1. Regional policy aiming at a reduction of relatively big regional differences, although
regional development in general may still be seen as successful.
1This section summarizes the presentation on the recent developments in the Czech Republic by Petr
Pomezny´ and the discussion of some problems of Czech economic policy in a subsequent session of the
workshop.
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2. Housing;
3. Export promotion in order to tackle the recently increasing trade deficit. The gov-
ernment of the Czech Republic does not share the opinions that were expressed by
some analysts that the Czech currency should be devalued in order to improve the
trade balance. According to the Czech government, the exchange rate of the koruna
is still below its purchasing power parity. Therefore, a devaluation would rather lead
to a conservation of some structural problems than improve the situation.
Market institutions in the Czech Republic are more or less in place and the govern-
ment’s policy is mainly aimed at improving the functioning of these institutions. The
Czech Republic fulfills currently three out of four Maastricht criteria. The economic pol-
icy is mainly concentrating on the situation of the Czech banking sector and the deficit of
the current account.
A new aim in the Czech policy is strengthening social peace. The focus on this aim
corresponds also to the increased weight of the opposition in the legislation following the
parliamentary election in 1996.
1.2 Hungary2
Hungary expects that the negotiations on Hungary’s accession to the EU could start at
the beginning of 1998 and could be finished in two years if both parties are well prepared.
Finally, the ratification in all 15 member states and in Hungary as well as the referendum
in Hungary could already be finished by 2002.
As a part of this medium-term integration policy, Hungary prepares for the accession
mainly in the following three areas:
1. Fulfillment of the Association Agreement in the second phase of trade liberalization
between the EU and Hungary, when the asymmetry in the reduction of trade barriers
applied during the initial years has to be abolished.
2. Preparing the answers to the EU questionnaire.
3. Anticipating the effects of joining the EU.
Hungary already fulfills the majority of the preconditions for entering the EU as defined
in the Copenhagen documents. The approximation of the Hungarian legal system to that
of the EU has already made progress and can be finished by the time of the expected
accession. In 1995, 65% and 60% of Hungarian exports and imports were related to the
EU, respectively. Moreover, machinery makes up 35% of Hungarian exports to the EU.
This share, that is the highest among the CEEC, points at the improved competitiveness
of Hungarian exports. The human side of accession, however, requires effort: the lack of
qualified civic servants for the negotiations as well as for the representation of the country
in the EU institutions could become a barrier to accession. Therefore, Hungary is now
preparing experts for the EU.
FDI is actively supported by the Hungarian government. As a part of this policy,
Hungary extended privatization to the so-called strategic sectors. FDI is expected further
improve the competitiveness of Hungarian products.
2The following section is based on the presentation on recent developments in Hungary by Andra´s
Inotai.
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An important aim of the government is the creation of conditions for growth in the next
few years. It is perceived, however, that growth has to be based on investment activity
and should not be consumption driven.
In the accession negotiations the most important topic for Hungary will be the po-
sition of agriculture and trade in agricultural products. While agriculture is of primary
importance for Hungary the cost of adjusting Hungarian agriculture to the EU market
could be lower than this cost would be in the other CEEC.
Concerning the introduction of the free movement of labor, Hungary expects a long
transition period following EU accession.
Hungary is expected to be a net recipient from the budget of the EU. Hungary’s
favorable experiences with the FDI indicate a high capital absorption capacity of the
Hungarian economy that will ensure a high effectiveness in the use of transfers from the
EU budget.
Another priority for Hungary is the creation of regional cooperation between the EU
(including its new members) and the countries that will not enter the EU in the first wave.
The importance of this question for Hungary is determined by security considerations,
trade relations of Hungary to other East European countries, and the large Hungarian
minorities in countries that are not expected to join the EU simultaneously with Hungary.
1.3 Poland3
In the last five years, Poland experienced the highest growth in Eastern Europe. The fast
development of the Polish economy continued in 1996. The increasing deficit of the trade
balance that emerged in the last two years could be covered by capital inflows.
As for relations with the EU, recently the main attention was paid to preparing the
answers to the EU questionnaire, and to fulfilling the membership criteria formulated
in Copenhagen. Poland showed good progress in harmonizing the legal system with the
norms of the EU, although some problems have been detected in other areas.
One of the problem areas is environmental standards of the EU that have to be applied
in the CEEC. The introduction of these standards may worsen the competitiveness of
Polish products.
Preparations for the next election may delay progress in some areas of EU accession
such as the security system.
1.4 Slovakia4
The aim of the Slovak Republic is to take part in the first wave of EU enlargement.
Hence, Slovak authorities concentrated on preparing the answers to the EU questionnaire.
Although the opposite is often expressed in international media, all major government
and opposition parties share the goal of an early EU accession. It is true, however, that
significant differences exist in this respect between different political subjects, including
the junior coalition members.
Nevertheless, the Slovak Republic shares the expected time schedule of enlargement
expressed by the presenter on Hungary with starting negotiations in 1998. The most
important gains for the Slovak Republic from the accession to the EU will be increased
market access, and better security and political guarantees.
3This section recapitulates the presentation on recent developments in Poland by Ewa Synowiec and
the subsequent discussion.
4This section summarizes the presentation on Slovakia by Igor Kos´ır.
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The harmonization of the Slovak legal system with the laws of the EU has already
showed progress. Actually, about 80% of Slovak legislation is already compatible with the
EU legislation.
Furthermore, the accession of the Slovak Republic is enhanced by its sound economic
development in recent years. In 1995 the growth rate reached the highest figure in Europe
with 7.4% and was expected to be again above 7% in 1996. Inflation was expected to
stabilize to only slightly more than 5% in 1996. Unemployment is high but declining; it
was expected to be 12% in 1996. This positive standing of the Slovak economy has only
slightly deteriorated in 1996 when the trade deficit increased to an estimated 8% of GDP.
1.5 Slovenia5
The situation of Slovenia is rather specific because it only recently succeeded to negotiate
the Association Agreement with the EU. As a result, the Association Agreement between
the EU and Slovenia is still in the ratification process. Therefore, the relations between
the EU and Slovenia are still regulated by the Cooperation Agreement.
Nevertheless, Slovenia applied for membership together with the other CEEC. There-
fore, Slovenia also received and answered the EU questionnaire in 1996. In view of an early
start of accession negotiations, Slovenia already started an information campaign on the
EU. Concerning the possible problems following from the accession to the EU, Slovenia
worries mainly about the lack of human resources for the negotiations.
The Slovene economy was slowly developing in 1996. Growth is based mainly on the
expansion of investments and domestic demand. The prospects for the Slovene economy
are optimistic as far as no new significant shocks are expected in the next few years.
2 Strength Reflected in Trade
2.1 Net Benefits from the Creation/Expansion of Integrations6
There are many stages of economic and political integration starting with a preferential
trade agreement followed by a free trade area and (complete and incomplete) customs
union. All these trade arrangements are restricted to the goal of increasing liberalization
of trade in goods and services. Countries participating in these arrangements do not
commit themselves to liberalize the movement of their production factors. Economic
policies of these countries also remain uncoordinated.
Further stages of the economic integration (including common market, economic union
and monetary union) aim mainly at liberalizing the movement of production factors. Eco-
nomic and monetary union, political union and full union focuses on improving the coor-
dination of policy among the member states.
Recently we can observe an increasing number and importance of trade arrangements
and integration proposals in the world. However, the two most important of these include
mostly the developed economies in Europe and Northern America. Integrations of these
two continents control about 60% of world trade.
The foundations of the EU were laid down by the Treaty of Rome in 1958 that included
six nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Accord-
ing to the classification presented above, the Treaty of Rome introduced an incomplete
customs union which was extended to customs union after the introduction of CAP in
5This section summarizes the description of recent developments in Slovenia by Marija Adanja and
Bojan Radej.
6This section recapitulates the presentation by Ja´nos Ga´cs.
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1968, and to the incomplete common market in 1970. The remaining West European na-
tions created the EFTA. However, former EFTA members Denmark, Ireland and the UK
joined the European Community in 1972. Furthermore, the EU was extended by Greece in
1981 and by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Through the reunification of Germany in 1991,
the EU was again enlarged by the former GDR. In 1993, a common market and economic
union was introduced through the single market and the European Economic Area (in the
latter with the exception of food products). In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined
the EU. As part of the next enlargement, the Association Agreements signed between 1992
and 1996 with ten East European economies will introduce a free trade area between the
EU and the CEEC by 2000.
The base for the integration later called the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) was provided by the free trade agreement in the automobile sector between the
USA and Canada in 1965. This trade arrangement was extended to most industrial goods
in 1988. Finally, Canada, Mexico and the USA signed the NAFTA in 1993 that should
introduce a free trade area among these countries by 2000. The enlargement of NAFTA
by some developed Latin American countries is also expected in later years.
The analysis of the economic impact of integrations usually focuses on static and
dynamic effects. The investigation of static effects usually deals with trade and welfare
effects.
The standard analysis of the customs union identifies two possible trade effects of
a customs union: trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation involves a shift
in domestic consumption from a high-cost domestic source to lower-cost imports from
the other participants of the new customs union. Trade diversion involves a shift in
consumption from a low-cost third country source to a higher-cost import from the partner
countries in the union, as a result of the elimination of tariffs on imports from the partner.
Trade creation improves the efficiency of the home country because it releases resources
for use in industries where it has a comparative advantage. In contrast, trade diversion is
damaging the home country because of the switch to a higher-cost import. The numerous
quantitative analyses of earlier EU enlargements showed that trade creation was much
more important than trade diversion (except for trade in agricultural products).
Empirical investigations showed a doubling of trade for the first six members of the
Common Market in 1955–1969 compared to the hypothetical case that the EC would not
have been set up. The first enlargement (with the UK) brought a 50% growth of intra-
trade while the enlargement with Spain and Portugal only a 10–15% increase. This decline
of integration impacts was due to the more liberal trade base from which new members
joined the EU in the 1970s and 1980s.
Welfare effects of an integration are analyzed in relation to three groups: consumers,
producers, and tax payers. The classic welfare analysis of the creation of a free trade area
with the rest of the world shows a clear welfare gain for the country concerned.
Quantitative investigations were as a rule not very successful to show significant welfare
effects of creating or enlarging integrations. They are usually at the level of 1% of GNP but
for instance the effect of the accession of the UK allegedly led to a meager 0.11% growth
of GDP in the UK. The analysis of welfare effects usually suffers from methodological
problems and from the lack of reliable data.
The theoretical literature also discusses several kinds of long-term restructuring ef-
fects, such as accumulation effects; increased competition and efficiency; economies of
scale; effects on size, growth and learning curve of companies; and increased industrial
interwovenness.
While the estimation of dynamic effects meets also numerous theoretical and practical
– 6–
difficulties the impact of the most recent extensions or deepening of integrations can be
justified by their tangible dynamic effects, rather than by their insignificant static trade
and welfare effects.
For instance, according to the Cecchini report, the aggregate effects of the introduction
of the single market in the EU was expected to be 5.3% of the total GDP. The removal
of production barriers was the most important source of benefits with 2.2% of GDP.
Economies of scale and increased competition contributed by 1.65% and 1.25% of GDP,
respectively. The impact of removing the non-tariff barriers was expected to be almost
negligible (0.2% of GDP).
The experience of former extensions of integrations predict that the coming accession
of East European countries to the EU would bring substantial gains for the new members.
The largest gains are expected for small countries that are open to international trade.
The existing members of the EU would not lose either. Past experience show no losses for
incumbent members from extensions, and most recent calculations also indicate that the
coming extension of the EU would bring some welfare gains for the EU15, not to mention
the huge benefit in the field of security.
2.2 Empirical Experience of Net Benefits in Western Europe from Trade
with the CEEC7
A cross-country investigation of aggregate trade data reveals a spectacular growth of trade
flows between the CEEC and the EU in recent years. For example, Austrian exports and
imports with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland grew at an annual rate
of nearly 20% between 1989 and 1994. In general, substantial regional differentiation and
large variations across commodities were revealed in a number of studies.
At the beginning of transition, all the EU countries’ trade with the CEEC was sig-
nificantly different from the structure of their total trade. On the other hand, the West
European economies worried that after a radical liberalization of trade with CEEC they
would lose whole industries in the competition with cheap imports from the CEEC. This
concern does not seem to be confirmed after six years of economic reforms and opening of
markets, although exports of the CEEC have moved slightly toward labor-intensive and/or
less processed products.
The opening of Eastern Europe was the precondition for rapid changes in the regional
structure of East–West foreign trade. The share of Central and East European countries
in the EU’s total exports and imports nearly doubled between 1988 and 1994. While the
share of Central and East European countries in overall EU trade is still moderate on
average (below 5%), trade with Eastern Europe accounts for more than 10% of trade of
the neighboring regions of CEEC (Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece).
Within the EU Austria has the highest share of exports to Eastern Europe. Austria
joins the four largest EU economies to form the leading EU exporters to and importers from
Eastern Europe in volume terms. Germany, Italy, France, Austria, and the UK account
for three quarters of the Union’s trade with Eastern Europe. While Austria shows a high
exposure to imports from Central and Eastern Europe, Austrian exports to the CEEC are
even higher than the imports from this region. The findings for Austria may predict the
impact of trade liberalization with the CEEC on other EU members.
The index of revealed comparative advantage (RCAi = (Xi −Mi)/(Xi +Mi) where
Xi and Mi are exports and imports of sector i) is widely used for the analysis of trade
7This section follows the presentation by Jarko Fidrmuc and his study “East–West Trade in Transition;
The Case of Austria”, co-authored by Christian Helmenstein and Peter Huber.
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flows of industries. The RCA index measures the commodity-specific degree of compar-
ative advantage by one country compared to other countries. In general, EU countries
have large positive RCA values in the SITC categories 6, 7, and 8 with the CEEC. In
the SITC categories 2, 3, and 4 EU countries seem to have a comparative disadvantage.
This development corresponds to the initial expectations of the EU’s specialization on
capital-intensive and human capital-intensive products, while the CEEC were assumed
to specialize on labor-intensive and resource-intensive commodities. However, recently all
SITC categories show strong dynamics in the CEEC. During the reforms the comparative
disadvantage of many EU countries in agriculture (SITC 0) has changed towards a slight
comparative advantage.
One-digit SITC groups, however, are too highly aggregated to identify the industries
with comparative advantages. This is illustrated by the fact that the revealed comparative
advantages are not uniformly retained at the SITC two-digit levels.
The RCA-index may be directly converted to the Grubel-Lloyd index by just expressing
GLIi = 1− | RCAi | that is used to address intra-industrial trade, GLIi = 1− | Xi −Mi |
/(Xi+Mi). Therefore, the recent changes and fluctuations of the RCA-indices may indicate
an increasing importance of intra-industry trade.
Based on the analysis of SITC two-digit commodity group trade flows of selected EU
countries (such as Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands) with the CEEC,
we can see that the overall growth was accompanied by the growth of intra-industry trade.
This means that East–West trade is becoming increasingly similar to intra-EU trade.
However, intra-industry trade between the EU and CEEC is rather low when compared
with intra-EU trade. This result underlines the fact that cooperation between the EU
and the CEEC on the branch level is still considerably less developed than within the
EU despite its growth since 1989. Therefore, we expect a growth of intra-industry trade
to be persistent during the next few years. A continuation of this development should
also contribute to overcome reservations about the EU’s Eastern enlargement related to
possible loss of employment in certain industries.
From the CEEC point of view, the frequently expressed concern that the East Euro-
pean economies might be captured in low-wage/low technology equilibria appears to be
overstated. Although the needed adjustments in response to the opening of Eastern Eu-
rope are high in both Eastern and Western Europe, the growing shares of intra-industrial
trade suggest that many potential losers in the EU also benefit from new trade opportu-
nities. The considerable contribution that the growth of intra-industry trade has made to
overall trade growth hence indicates less significant production losses in Western Europe
than suggested by earlier estimates. The effect of these developments on employment,
however, remains to be studied.
The discussion following the presentation by Fidrmuc stressed that the adjustment
costs of opening and integration of the CEEC into the EU are expected to be lower
when intra-industrial trade accounts for the major part of trade growth. FDI is also
contributing to the increase of intra-industrial trade. Some participants, however, pointed
out that other studies found significant differences among the CEEC with many East
European producers specializing on low-value added products. It was also emphasized
that if one further disaggregates commodity groups, major quality differences appear and
the observed pattern of trade does not fulfill the strict definition of the intra-industry
trade (trade with the same products). Nevertheless, such differences can be reduced in
later years.
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2.3 Service Trade — Trends in the EU after 19928
The importance of services has been steadily growing in industrialized countries due to
two reasons: first, in response to growing income, reduction of working time, and changes
of tastes, the share of leisure in total consumption increases. Second, deep structural
changes take place in the manufacturing industry, such as placing service activities into
separate companies (outsourcing).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the share of services in gross value added was about
63% both in Japan and in the EU; the USA with its 75% of gross value added was the
most service-intensive economy. Spain’s share of services (66% of gross value added) was
slightly above the EU average.
The CEEC show significantly lower shares of services, therefore, a rapid growth of the
service sector may be expected in the process of accession of the CEEC into the EU. A
similar development could be observed in Spain after its entrance into the EU.
In comparison to goods, services have the following four characteristic features:
1. Services are non-storable. The production and consumption of services have to take
place simultaneously at the same time and in the same location.
2. Many services are non-tradable.
3. The quality of services cannot be assessed prior to the consumption due to their
intangible nature; this feature leads to problems of asymmetric information.
4. Services are regulated in most countries due to the existence of market failures
(associated with imperfect competition, imperfect information, externalities, natural
or public monopolies, etc.).
These specific properties of the services imply a physical proximity between providers
and users of services. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle trade in services from factor
flows. In certain services (financial and professional services) providers and users do not
need to move, whereas in other services (tourism) users have to move. On the other hand,
trade with some services (engineering, accounting, advertising, consulting or distribution)
requires the temporary or permanent movement of factors. The first type of trade with
services is referred to as commodity trade, while the second type is called factor trade.
The factor trade of services is often associated with FDI.
Empirical analyses suggest that the conventional trade theory also applies to trade in
services. Under perfect competition in the service sector, the liberalization of trade in
services is welfare enhancing. However, the case of imperfect competition remains largely
unexplored in the literature. Nevertheless, factor endowments seem to be an important
determinant of trade patterns in services. High-income countries are relatively special-
ized in banking, insurance and communications, while low-income countries are relatively
specialized in hotels, catering, distribution and construction.
In 1980, the import of services represented 13.4% of total import in the EU, while it
stood at 15.4% and 16.8% in the USA and Japan, respectively. In the middle of the 1990s,
the import of services reached 18% in the EU and the USA and 28% in Japan.
The share of export of services has been stable in the EU (20%) and Japan (11%) since
1980, while in the USA it increased from 20% in 1980 to 27% in the middle of the 1990s.
Consequently, the EU and the USA show a significant trade surplus while Japan has a
trade deficit in services.
8This section summarizes the presentation and discussion of the paper “Service Trade — Trends in the
EU after EU92” by Carlos Martinez.
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The import penetration has not increased dramatically in any of the analyzed major
regions during the last 15 years, although we can observe significant differences: the import
of services represent 7.7% of gross value added in the EU, 3.7% in Japan, and only 2.5%
in the USA.
The export intensity of the service sector was also stable in the EU with exports of
services representing about 9.5% of total gross value added. The export intensity showed
a decreasing trend in Japan, while the opposite was observed in the USA.
Intra-EU trade in services has grown much more than the total trade in services during
the last ten years. Of the EU’s total figures, the extra-union exports of services accounted
for 60% of the EU’s total exports of services in 1985 and 50% in 1994. Similarly, the share
of extra-EU imports of services of the EU’s total imports of services declined from 53.2%
in 1985 to 48.6% in 1995. In this process of increasing intra-trade intensity in services it
is difficult to distinguish the effects of creating a single market from the impact of new
technology and internationalization in the service sector.
The intra-union trade in services is closely related to FDI. Actually, 63% of invest-
ment flows between the member states is targeted to the service sector. This dramatic
development has been associated with an increased number of mergers and acquisitions.
From the point of view of future developments in the CEEC it is worth looking at the
past experiences of Spain.
Spain started with low imports (9.5% of total imports) and high exports of services
(38% of total exports). Following the accession of Spain into the EU, the imports of
services followed the same evolution as in the EU, but they still remained below the
union’s average. Simultaneously, the exports of services (mainly tourism) declined to 30%
of total exports in 1995. Nevertheless, the surplus in trade in services is significant.
We can observe a growing trend in the import penetration of services, although the
import penetration to Spain’s service sector is still below the EU average. In contrast, the
export intensity of Spanish services is slightly higher than in the EU. Mainly trade with
other member states of the union is increasing due to both the integration into the EU
and the opening of markets in the EU. The share of the extra-union exports of services
declined from 42.6% in 1980 to 24.4% of total exports in 1990. Simultaneously, the share
of extra-union imports of services fell from 52.3% in 1980 to 37.6% of total imports of
services in 1994. The intra-union trade in the service sector has been supported by the
strong investment activity after the accession. Between 1986 and 1991, total FDI in Spain
grew five-fold.
The Spanish case reveals that the CEEC may experience major changes after their
accession to the EU with respect to the importance of trade in services, regional structure
of exports and imports of services, and FDI related to the service sector.
The discussion after the presentation by Mr. Martinez was mainly devoted to the devel-
opment of different types of services and the relation between trade in services and FDI. It
was pointed out, that the individual EU countries cannot be compared with the USA and
Japan due to the different size of these economies; EU countries are more comparable to
former EFTA-countries, although the latter are too small for such comparisons. Transport
services and airlines had significant effects on the development of trade in services.
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3 Investment and Competitiveness
3.1 Capital Movements to European Integration:
The Spanish Experience9
Similar problems as those associated with capital inflows and outflows in Spain can be
currently observed in the CEEC. Therefore, it is possible to draw some implications from
the Spanish experience for the forthcoming incorporation of the CEEC into the EU.
The accession of Spain into the EU coincided with an exceptionally marked cyclical
upturn and progress of the integration among the member states (creation of the single
market, liberalization of capital flows, integration of financial markets in the member
states, etc.). Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between surges in capital inflows
linked to the integration and to other events.
The reasons for the capital inflows to Spain are remarkably similar to the causes of
current developments in the CEEC. In the literature, the following five basic reasons ex-
plaining capital inflows into Spain (or more generally to emerging markets) were identified:
1. A change in economic policy that improves its credibility, whereby international
financial markets anticipate better macroeconomic results;
2. monetary tightness that raises the level of interest rates;
3. external influences (economic development in source countries);
4. contagion or the so-called band-wagon effects (e.g., capital inflows into neighboring
countries or change in risk premia that determine the international distribution of
capital); and
5. direct investment linked to companies’ decisions to locate economic activity in the
single market of the EU.
The first and the last factors are associated with more permanent capital inflows, while
the other factors are more temporary and vulnerable to changes in the related underlying
factors.
In general, the effects of foreign capital are undoubtedly beneficial for the target coun-
try: they reduce the financing constraints linked to the balance of payments. Furthermore,
they contribute to the investment that the target country needs for its convergence to the
rich countries. Finally, they prompt the modernization of the financial sector and im-
provement of its efficiency.
However, along with their unquestionable positive effects, sizable capital inflows may
entail certain drawbacks. First, they are often associated with a current account deficits
that may have adverse long-term consequences. Second, capital inflows are not sustainable
if they are used to finance consumption rather than investment. Third, they often induce
monetary control problems and inflationary pressures. These are particularly serious in
countries involved in integrating with countries with a tradition of price stability (as in
Spain and in the CEEC). Fourth, capital inflows are usually associated with an appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate. This may be especially serious for countries striving to
lower trade barriers and compete with more powerful economies. Finally, capital inflows
increase the vulnerability of a country and its economic policy to the potential reversal of
these flows due to either domestic or external factors.
9This section references the presentation and discussion of the paper “Capital Movements to European
Integration: The Spanish Experience” by Santiago Ferna´ndez de Lis.
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In Spain, the overall effect of the capital movements was clearly positive, although they
created some problems. From the CEEC point of view, the main lesson is that if fiscal
policy is not adjusted, the loss of competitiveness associated with the inflation differential
will lead to an abrupt turn-around in capital flows and to an exchange rate crisis. If this
coincides with a cyclical deceleration, the costs of adapting to the new situation will be
greater.
Between 1986 and 1992, Spain’s balance of payments recorded capital inflows totaling
USD 102.5 billion, an annual average of USD 14.6 billion or 3.7% of the GDP. Although
capital outflows were liberalized partially and increased significantly in this period, the
capital account was clearly in surplus. That translated into a growth of reserves, because
of a current account deficit smaller than the new inflows. Direct investment accounted for
about a third of total private capital inflows between 1986 and 1989. Portfolio investment
was also significant, while short-term capital inflows were moderate. In 1990 and 1991,
purchases in bonds and long-term loans gained in importance.
The inflow of foreign capital was used to finance investment rather than consumption.
Therefore, it contributed to the high GDP growth rate that was above the EU’s average
in this period.
However, some problems related to capital inflows were also observed: capital that
was attracted by high interest rates induced a growth in money supply. The attempts to
sterilize this excess supply prompted further rises in interest rates that in turn attracted
more foreign capital. As a result, inflation remained high in comparison to the EU’s
average. This led to a strong real appreciation of the peseta and loss of competitiveness
of Spanish producers.
The Spanish authorities responded with various measures: first, they introduced con-
trols on capital inflows, although this step was contradictory to the commitment to liber-
alize these flows. Second, they set limit on credit growth. Third, the peseta was linked to
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in June 1989. It is difficult to assess the effects of
entry to the ERM, but it is likely that this move prevented either an even more pronounced
strengthening of the peseta or a greater building up of reserves necessary to maintain the
peseta’s actual rate.
The reversal of the capital flows in the period 1992 and 1993 is attributable to various
external factors (the German reunification and the resulting differences between the busi-
ness cycles in Germany and other member states, uncertainty in respect to the coming of
monetary union, speculative capital movements) and domestic reasons (loss of competi-
tiveness). Between August 1992 and July 1993, Spain experienced a net capital outflow of
nearly USD 15 billion. Nevertheless, this amount was remarkably lower than the inflows
recorded in the previous period.
The Spanish authorities reacted to the capital outflow by two devaluations of the
peseta in September and November 1992 and by widening its fluctuation band in July
1993. Finally, the most recent period is marked by a return to normal capital movements.
The discussion following the presentation by Ferna´ndez de Lis was mainly devoted to
the possible lessons for the CEEC from the Spanish experience. It was emphasized that
Spain had good experiences with the FDI that were attracted also due to the government’s
liberal approach to FDI and privatization. With respect to net EU transfers, since Spain
was a net contributor initially and only later became a net receiver from the EU budget,
one can assume that the size of net EU transfers had not much impact on the capital
inflows to Spain.
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3.2 Experience of FDI in Eastern Europe10
According to UNCTAD, in 1994 FDI in the CEEC accounted for only USD 6.3 billion of
total USD 226 billion of FDI flows in the world economy. The CEEC received only 2.8%
of FDI flows in the world economy while, for comparison, China received about 12% (USD
27 billion) of these flows in 1994. The cumulated stock of the FDI in the CEEC is also
marginal. According to estimates, less than USD 30 million was invested in Eastern Europe
including the former Soviet Union. Moreover, these flows of FDI concentrated heavily
on a few countries, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Hungary
accumulated far more capital than any other country in the region. The total cumulated
stock of FDI accounts for about 30% of GDP in Hungary, 14% in Estonia, 13% in the
Czech Republic, 7% in Poland and less than 5% in all other Eastern European countries.
This documents two general observations on FDI in Eastern Europe. First, the countries
with the highest FDI are not countries with the lowest wage level in the region. Second,
foreign companies have substantial direct influence on the economic development in only
four countries of the CEEC.
However, FDI still could have significant positive effects on the development in tran-
sition economies. First, FDI must have contributed significantly to the investments in
transition economies including the introduction of new technologies. Foreign owned com-
panies accounted for about a third of total investment in Hungary, and over 10% in Poland
and the Czech Republic in 1994. Second, FDI (both greenfield investments and take-overs
through privatization by foreign investors) created new capacities and employment op-
portunities. Third, FDI improved the balance of payments of transition countries. This
latter macroeconomic effect is especially important for countries with significant debt bur-
den. Finally, FDI creates additional revenues for the state budget through privatization
revenues.
Earlier studies showed that FDI followed often previous commercial links with firms in
the CEEC. The primary motive of investors was to capture local market shares. Reduction
of production costs (as an independent determinant) was less important. Both types
favored political stability and good pre-investment relations to local partners.
In the discussion following the presentation, Miklo´s Szanyi explained Hungary’s good
FDI performance by several factors, such as the Hungarian government’s active policy
of foreign investment promotion, and the early openness of the Hungarian economy for
foreigners (trade, tourism and investment). Alena Zempl´ınerova´11 quoted results of her
study on the FDI in the Czech economy: data show that foreign firms performed better
than Czech firms between 1992 and 1995. The better performance of foreign-owned firms
had the following reasons. First, foreign investors were investing in better firms. Second,
the investment is higher in firms with a foreign owner than in Czech firms. Therefore, the
firms with foreign investment are modernized faster. Third, they have higher productivity
and foreign firms are also paying wages 20% above the Czech average. However, foreign
investments are low in labor intensive industries. Finally, the firms with high FDI are
often more export-oriented than the average Czech firm.
10This section summarizes the presentation and discussion of the paper “Experiences of Foreign Direct
Investment in Eastern Europe: Advantages and Disadvantages” by Miklo´s Szanyi.
11An analysis of FDI into the Czech Republic can be found in the paper “Czech Trade Policy Within
the European Framework” by Alena Zempl´ınerova´ which was distributed at the workshop.
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3.3 Export Competitiveness in the Manufacturing Industry
of the CEEC12
The rapid reorientation of trade of the CEEC has been the outstanding feature in the first
half of the 1990s. In 1989, the EU accounted for only about 25% of CEEC exports. By
1995, between 40% (Bulgaria) and 80% (Slovenia) of the exports were conducted with the
EU (including former EFTA-members), and the regional structure of CEEC trade basically
returned to their pre-World War II patterns. This development was supported by trade
liberalization in the CEEC (abolition of the state’s foreign trade monopoly, introduction
of current account convertibility), the dissolution of the CMEA, the suspension of most
quotas on imports from the CEEC to the EU, the inclusion of the CEEC in the GSP
system, and subsequently by tariff concessions for industrial products contained in the
Association Agreements.
However, an asymmetry exists between the importance of East-West trade relations
for the CEEC and the EU. While the EU accounts for the bulk of CEEC exports, these
countries have only marginal importance for the EU. Despite recent growth, the CEEC
accounted for only slightly more than 6% of EU imports of manufacturing products in
1994. Therefore, any trade measure has a much larger impact on the CEEC than on the
EU, and fluctuations in the West European business cycle have a great impact on the
CEEC.
Trade liberalization in the EU including the asymmetry of the Europe Agreements in
favor of the CEEC could not offset the generally low export competitiveness and supply-
side bottlenecks of the CEEC. Recently, trade deficits of the CEEC increased significantly.
Manufacturing trade of the CEEC with the EU has turned from a slight surplus in 1990
to a deficit of ECU 5.1 billion in 1993 and ECU 5.0 billion in 1994 that further increased
to ECU 6 billion in 1995. In 1994, the highest trade deficit was incurred by Poland (ECU
1.9 billion) followed by the Czech Republic (ECU 1.5 billion) and Hungary (ECU 1.3
billion). The emergence of trade deficits in virtually all CEEC reopened the question
of their competitiveness in comparison to the EU. Key features of competitiveness is
addressed below through the analysis of the similarity of export and import structures of
the EU and the CEEC, through the investigation of market share development, revealed
comparative advantage, labor productivity, and unit labor costs. The calculations were
made on three-digit data for 108 NACE industries.
We should keep in mind that the period for which data is available (1989 to 1994)
is too short and too turbulent (including both transformational recession and the recent
recovery) for the analysis of long-term comparative advantage.
The distance measure is defined as Dij =
√∑
k S
k
j (S
k
i − S
k
j )
2, where Ski and S
k
j are
the shares of industry k in total exports in years i and j. Using distance measures of the
structure of foreign trade (exports and/or imports) in 1989 and 1994, one can see that the
exports of the CEEC experienced huge structural shifts during this period. These struc-
tural changes were stronger than those observed on the import side. The most pronounced
structural shifts occurred in Romania and Bulgaria, while the lowest adjustment was seen
in the former Czechoslovakia.
An analogous analysis of correlation coefficients of trade structures in 1989 and later
years reveals that the structure of exports returned partially back to the old pattern in all
CEEC except for Hungary in 1994.
The distance measures between export and/or import structure in the EU and the
12This section summarizes the paper “Export Competitiveness in Manufacturing Industry of CEEC” by
Peter Havlik which was distributed at the workshop. Due to illness, Peter Havlik could not participate at
the workshop.
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CEEC show that CEEC export other commodities than those prevailing in the total
imports of the EU. While Czechoslovakia and Hungary seem to adjust their export pattern
to the demand of the EU in recent years, while the difference for Poland, Bulgaria and
especially Romania is even getting larger. Actually, only the Czech Republic (followed by
Slovenia) is coming close to the pattern of EU import demand.
Furthermore, a comparison of the similarity of exports of the CEEC reveals increasing
similarity of exports for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland between 1989 and 1994.
Therefore, these countries (and Austria) might increasingly compete in the same prod-
ucts. On the other hand, their export structure is increasingly diverting from the export
structure of Bulgaria and Romania.
The emergence of two groups of countries in Eastern Europe is also visible in their
specialization on the EU market. In general, one can observe a broad export specializa-
tion pattern in the CEEC on labor-intensive industries and away from capital-intensive
branches, although there are many exceptions from this general rule. The energy-intensive
industries belong to the declining branches. Besides, there are considerable differences be-
tween the individual CEEC. In Slovenia, labor-intensive industries are, for example, losing
position due to relatively high unit labor costs. More sophisticated industries show also
a surprising improvement of their indices of comparative advantage during the reform
period.
Between 1989 and 1994, the following three-digit NACE-industries of the CEEC re-
corded the largest gains in market shares in the EU: iron and steel (NACE 221), non-
ferrous metals (224), cement (242), petrochemicals (252) tools and finished metal goods
(316), insulated wires and cables (341), electrical machinery (342), motor vehicles (351),
knitting industry (436), footwear (451) and clothing (453). These industries were also
confirmed by the analysis of revealed comparative advantage (see also section 2.2).
At current exchange rates, wages in the CEEC are only a fraction of the EU level.
However, labor productivity is also lower in the CEEC. Another part of the advantage of
low wages and undervalued currencies is eliminated by the quality gap between Western
and Eastern products (including marketing, packing, delivery conditions, service level).
The aggregate productivity in the CEEC (real GDP at purchasing power parities per
employed person) reaches the highest level in Slovenia (54% of the Austrian level in 1993),
followed by the Czech Republic (40%), Slovakia (37%), Hungary (33%) and Poland (28%).
In 1995, unit labor costs (calculated as a ratio of nominal annual wage and productivity
and divided by the nominal ECU exchange rate) represented the following shares of the
Austrian level: in Slovenia 61%, followed by Poland with 36%, Hungary with 33%, the
Czech Republic with 28% and Romania with 25%.
4 Agriculture in the CEEC: Possibilities, Preconditions and
Consequences of EU Accession13
The integration of agriculture of the CEEC to the EU will be one of the most sensitive
issues due to the crucial importance of agriculture in both the CEEC and the EU. The
CEEC have significant advantages in the agricultural production in comparison to the EU.
The agricultural area of the CEEC represents 22%, the arable land area 30% of the EU
13This section summarizes the presentation and discussion of the paper “Agriculture in the CEEC:
Possibilities, Preconditions and Consequences of the EU Accession” by Judit Kiss. The analysis deals
with the Visegra´d countries, therefore in this section CEEC refers to the Visegra´d four countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).
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figures, while the population and total GDP (in nominal exchange rates) of the CEEC
correspond to just 17% and 2.4% of EU population and output, respectively.
Despite recent declines in their agricultural production the share of agriculture in GDP
in the CEEC is more than twice as high as in the EU with 5.7% and 2.5%, respectively.
Moreover, total agricultural employment in the four CEEC (4.5 million employees) is
more than half of the total agricultural employment in the 15 EU countries (8.2 million
employees).
Data, however, also reveal the low productivity level of agriculture in the CEEC in
comparison to the EU: labor productivity is around 14-times higher in the EU than in
the CEEC. Furthermore, there are significant differences in labor productivity between
the CEEC with the highest labor productivity in Hungary and the lowest in Poland.
Consequently, agricultural production in the CEEC could significantly increase and/or a
significant out-migration from the agricultural sector may follow the catching-up of the
labor productivity level with those in the EU. However, the increase of labor productivity
in the CEEC necessitates significant agricultural investment.
Land productivity differences are less significant than labor productivity gaps, with
land productivity in the EU being 5.9 times higher than in the CEEC. Land productivity
is higher in Hungary than in the other CEEC.
Between 1989 and 1994 the real aggregate agricultural output of the CEEC declined
considerably; the decline varied between 20% (in Poland) and 35% (in Hungary). There
are a great number of factors underlying this sharp decrease of agricultural production
including the drop in domestic and external demand, loss of traditional markets in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union, growth of agricultural imports from the EU,
increasing gap between input and output prices, restructuring of agriculture, etc.
Currently, the drop in agricultural production seems to bottom out in Slovakia and
Hungary, while the contraction continues in the Czech Republic. In Poland, agriculture
experienced a first recovery in 1993 that was followed by a fall in crop production due to
drought in 1994.
According to forecasts for agriculture in the CEEC, supply and demand could adjust to
the transition shocks by the end of 1990s. Growth in income will lead to a certain recovery
of demand for agricultural products. This will mainly include livestock products; the pre-
transition levels of per capita production will be not reached, though. In the production
of crops, the share of cereals and oilseeds, which have a higher export potential than in
the pre-transition period, will increase. The export potential of dairy products, however,
is significantly lower than in the pre-transition period. Price differentials between the EU
and the CEEC will continue despite their reduction for certain products.
The EU is the most important trade partner of the CEEC in agricultural products:
more than 50% of agricultural trade of the CEEC is related to the EU. However, the
EU’s agricultural exports to the CEEC represent only 8% of total agricultural exports of
the EU, and the EU’s agricultural imports from the CEEC constitute only 5% of total
agricultural imports of the EU.
The Association Agreements only partially improved the market access for the CEEC
in the EU. Certain agricultural products were not included in the preferences granted
by the EU, while in other cases the non-tariff barriers (quotas, variable levies, minimum
prices, etc.) and/or insufficient concessions squeeze the agricultural products of the CEEC
out of the EU market. On the other hand, some opportunities could not be utilized by
the CEEC due to the lack of exportable commodities and/or low competitiveness of their
products.
On the other side, the Europe Agreements allow the EU to provide subventions to
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exports to the CEEC. Furthermore, the CEEC lifted import restrictions and non-tariff
barriers in the course of their transformation.
The insufficient liberalization of agricultural trade by the Europe Agreements and
various domestic factors led to the stagnation of agricultural exports of the CEEC to the
EU and growth of imports from the EU resulting in a worsening of the trade balance in
agricultural commodities. Between 1989 and 1994, the agricultural trade balance of the
CEEC turned from a surplus of ECU 988 million into a deficit of ECU 250 million.
Since the CEEC face significant trade deficits, they look for possibilities to increase
their agricultural exports. A necessary pre-condition for this is to increase their domes-
tic production in order to produce exportable surpluses. Further requirements are the
introduction of an export promotion system, better financing conditions, improvement of
quality, packing, and fulfillment of sanitary and health requirements of the potential mar-
kets. In addition, certain efforts could be made to upgrade the Association Agreements
to include the extension of concessions, elimination of quotas or introduction of their con-
vertibility within product groups, and elimination or reduction of export subsidies on the
EU’s exports to the CEEC.
The (short-run) interests of the EU and the CEEC in the process of accession may be
considerably different: the CEEC want to increase their agricultural exports to the EU
market (however, without opening the EU market for third countries), while the EU would
like to increase its agricultural exports to the CEEC without opening the internal market
and providing (too high) financial help for them. Since the interests are not compatible
due to either the exclusion of the CEEC from the common market or to high budgetary
costs of Eastern enlargement, five options are currently being discussed:
1. Adoption of the current common agricultural policy (CAP) for the CEEC leading,
however, to an additional annual budgetary burden in the EU between ECU 23
billion and ECU 42 billion;
2. Introduction of a radical reform of CAP; this would meet resistance of farm lobbies
in the present member states;
3. Replacement of the CAP by a dual CAP system or by a two-tier agricultural pol-
icy; this would not fulfill the expectations of the CEEC, and would be politically
unsustainable and incompatible with the single market principle;
4. Re-nationalization of the CAP (meaning that each member state would have the
responsibility to provide agricultural subventions) with similar effects as in the pre-
vious point;
5. Long transitional periods that shift the needed decisions to later periods.
Currently, none of these five approaches seems to be feasible and/or acceptable for both
partners. Nevertheless, it is likely that a gradual and mutual adjustment and harmoniza-
tion process will take place in order to create pre-conditions for the Eastern enlargement
of the EU.
In the intensive discussion following the presentation by Judit Kiss, it was mentioned
that agricultural trade is actually gaining importance among the CEEC. Several partic-
ipants stressed that the reform of the CAP is not a new but an old problem of the EU.
The CAP reform has a political character: agriculture has a marginal effect on GDP and
consumers’ expenditures in the EU, but it has a high political importance.
–17 –
5 Environment: Eastern Europe’s Potential Environmental
Threat to Europe with and without EU Membership14
Environmental concerns and the anticipation of EU enlargement were among the reasons
for political changes in the CEEC before 1990. In fact, the introduction of EU compatible
legal regulations, governmental, market and technological systems would automatically
improve the environmental problems in the CEEC. Furthermore, the combination of both
aims leads to an interesting alliance between the environmentalists and business, (espe-
cially business which is export oriented) to support the approximation of the EU. Actually,
the same legal environment helps in the CEEC to achieve access to the EU market and
improve environmental conditions.
Both the EU and the CEEC have the following common goals in the approximation
process:
1. coherence of environmental regulatory conditions for economic activities in the CE-
EC with those in the EU;
2. realistic terms of agreement regarding environmental compliance between the EU
and future members;
3. preparing future members for their rights and obligations in the EU.
Generally, the existing environmental legislation in CEEC is more or less approximated
to EU norms. It is, in many cases, similar to EU directives, but may be not sufficiently
precise. In some cases, legislation is lacking or is fundamentally different from the EU
approach.
The situation in individual areas of environmental protection is as follows:
1. Most CEEC have new environmental framework laws that include most of the basic
elements of EU environmental legislation;
2. There is close compliance with the EU’s legislation in the field of nature conservation
due to a long tradition of conservation in the region and the application of many
international legal instruments;
3. Air protection is recognized as the main priority area because of its direct impact
on human health;
4. Water quality protection shows many conceptual similarities with the EU, and the
technical differences are being eliminated relatively quickly;
5. Less attention is given to chemicals, industrial risks, biotechnology and waste man-
agement in the legislation of the CEEC;
6. There is a lack of regulations regarding product standards as opposed to ambient
level regulations.
In contrast to progress in the regulatory framework, the enforcement of environmental
legislation is still insufficient in most CEEC. The improvement of the enforcement capacity
is probably the most critical item of the approximation agenda in the CEEC because if
legislation can not be enforced, it has only little or even no impact on the behavior of actors
14This section summarizes the presentation of the environmental issues by Jernej Stritih.
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in the country. Therefore, the legal system compatible with the EU is not implemented
until its enforcement is ensured.
While the CEEC is behind the EU in terms of certain regulations and in enforcement,
the CEEC definitely have some advantages in comparison to the EU. Lifestyle in the
CEEC is less wasteful than in the West, although the consumption pattern is approaching
the West European style of life in recent years. The CEEC is characterized by higher
biodiversity than the countries of the EU. The recent changes in the CEEC offer more
opportunity for an environmentally conscious restructuring than in the EU countries and
the East European countries provide a better field for policy innovations than the countries
of the EU.
According to preliminary estimates, the costs of implementing EU standards in the
CEEC will be high. However, these costs could not be avoided either if these countries
did not join the EU. On the other hand, there is scope for various kinds of international
cooperation in sharing costs.
In the discussion following the presentation of Jernej Stritih it was mentioned that a
multiplicity of EU assistance schemes should be used to remedy the existing environmental
damages in the CEEC and for supporting environmentally friendly restructuring.
6 Political and Security Issues15
Security issues involve a number of questions related to the process of enlarging the EU
and NATO. These include the relation between enlarging the EU and NATO, military
and non-military aspects of the security policy, the position of the CEEC to the current
reform of the EU, relation between security policy and minorities, migration, position of
third countries, etc.
Currently, there are no military threats either to the EU or the CEEC. In fact, the
non-military threats are more important than the military ones. Therefore, the expansion
of the EU has positive implications for the security of both sides. In fact, the Europe
Agreements have already dealt with some security issues.
Migration has an increasing importance in the security policy. The candidate countries
are, as a rule, not source countries of illegal migration to the EU. Their integration to the
EU, however, would improve the security of both the old and the new members due to
the existence of migration roads through Central Eastern Europe. Since 1991, Hungary
returned 2.5 million people that tried to enter illegally. The CEEC serves as a filter
against migration pressures. Borders need more protection measures, however, these were
restricted by the budgetary situation in Hungary. After the accession, the CEEC would
have better means to deal with illegal migration.
The positions of the individual CEEC are only slightly different from each other. The
Czech Republic stresses the first pillar of the EU, while security issues are considered less
important. Nevertheless, through its application for EU membership the Czech Republic
accepted the broader, non-economic aspects of the EU. On the other hand, NATO en-
largement is the process which is seen as the main source of security guarantees, especially
because of the presence of the USA in NATO. This view of the USA’s role in Europe is
also shared by other CEEC.
Istva´n Szo˝nyi stressed the importance of the CEEC for the relation between the EU and
the USA. If there will be no progress in EU enlargement although NATO will be enlarged,
the USA will be left alone with total responsibility for security in Europe. However, the
15This section summarizes the talks by Stanislav Stach, Istva´n Szo˝nyi and Antoni Kaminski on security
issues.
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non-enlargement of both the EU and NATO would have even worse consequences: it would
show that the West European nations are unable to take responsibility for the future
of Europe. Both scenarios would significantly undermine the principle of international
solidarity and could induce the USA to show less interest for Europe.
In the process of the decision making reform in the EU, the Czech approach in general
prefers majority voting, although with different positions provided for individual countries.
However, the veto right should be further applied for security issues.
According to the Hungarian point of view, security policy is closely related to the
position of minorities. The importance of this issue, however, seems to be over-emphasized
currently by the EU. Nationalism, in fact is declining in the CEEC; the expected growth
in the next few years will improve the income situation of the population in the CEEC
and thus reduce nationalism. Moreover, there have been no military conflicts among the
Central European nations in the past decades. Nevertheless, it is clear that the integration
process will also help to stabilize the relations of minorities in Eastern Europe because it
would imply a commitment to solve the existing problems.
The Polish approach to security is strongly influenced by Poland’s geographical position
between Germany and Ukraine. Germany stresses its strong interest in the integration of
Poland to the EU. The threats for the security of Poland are seen rather in criminality
and terrorism than in danger to the national identity.
The general discussion stressed that the enlargement of the EU would be an important
contribution to European security. The EU enlargement would be instrumental also in
tackling the budgetary costs incurred after the accession to NATO. In the Czech Republic
for instance, currently, military expenditures account for 2.5% of GDP. The upgrade to the
NATO standard would, however, require an increase of military expenditures to at least
3.5% for about six years. The budgetary burden would have a significant social impact.
Accession to the EU could contribute to these investments into European security both
by improving the economic conditions through enlargement and by providing subsidies to
the new members to reduce the social impact of more military expenditures.
7 Forming Consistent Transformation and Integration
Policies for an Enlarged Europe16
The enlargement of the EU is one of the most important tasks facing the whole world. This
enlargement will have to be based on solidarity within as well as between nations, other-
wise the enlargement will fail. However, its failure is actually possible due to nationalist
ideology, intolerance, and populism.
The EU has evolved to strengthen the capabilities of European nations to withstand
those tendencies. Since its foundation, the EU is, in the deepest sense, a political project.
The project of European integration now faces new tasks: to deepen cooperation in more
complex issues, to introduce a common currency, and to achieve a historically unprece-
dented enlargement.
Despite all the uncertainties, we can believe that the enlargement of the EU will
happen, but we do not know any another details: who, when or how. Despite the many
solemn declarations and the overall rapid and positive changes taking place in the applicant
countries, the enlargement in any specific sense is not given. Neither the potential new
members, nor the present members, are set on a safe course to manage the enlargement.
16This section summarizes the talk and paper entitled as above by Mats Karlsson.
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The CEEC often seem to take the enlargement for granted because anything else, ac-
cording to their views, would be betrayal that surely cannot happen again. In fact, much
could happen that would postpone enlargement, or lock some or even all applicants out
from the deep integration. Currently, the public in the CEEC is supporting the integra-
tion into the EU. However, the negative side of the economic balance of entering the EU
will be highly visible, easily exploitable, and thereby may undermine public support. Fur-
thermore, the enlargement by the EFTA-countries showed the complexity of the entrance
negotiations including the specifics of security policy, policy dealing with issues of signifi-
cant social interest (e.g., alcohol policy in Sweden), but also many seemingly minor issues
(e.g., wet snuff in Sweden). Although these examples are not applicable to the CEEC,
other specific issues may emerge in the process of negotiations.
Concerning the present members, the inter-governmental conference and the monetary
union both place their governments under strain. However, for the enlargement to happen
it will have to be supported by the populations in these countries. West European govern-
ments and EU administrators have to show their citizens the consequences of enlargements
and the intrinsically win–win situation characterizing enlargement.
Furthermore, some countries will not become members in the first round either be-
cause they do not meet the conditions following from the membership despite starting the
negotiations at the same time as the other CEEC, or because they have no prospects for
the membership in the foreseeable future (e.g., Russia and Ukraine). However, those who
are left outside must have a structured link in order to include them into the community
of the European nations. This link has also to minimize the risk of political backlash in
the countries not included in the first wave of the enlargement.
Finally, the EU has to be enlarged in a way that will improve its working. Old and
new members will have to share the institutions of the EU: the commission, the ministerial
councils, and the European Parliament. To manage the enlargement, we will have to deeply
share the values in which the EU is rooted.
8 Summary
In 1995–1996, the countries that have the highest chances to start accession negotia-
tions with the European Union soon (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia) showed palpable developments: output sustained its balanced growth, while the
regulatory framework of the economy was gradually being prepared for harmonization
with the EU.
The experience of earlier integrations and enlargements of integrations show that eco-
nomic benefits associated with integrations are not easy to identify. While at the early
stage of integrations trade creation and static welfare benefits dominate, enlargements in
the later stage bring advantages that unfold in dynamic processes but are not easy to dis-
cern. While benefits are more obvious for the countries that join integrations, calculations
never showed losses from enlargements for incumbent members.
The rapid growth and structural shift in trade between Austria and the CEEC may
indicate similar developments with other EU members in the period following CEEC acces-
sion to the European Union. The trade structures of some of the East European countries
are slowly already converging to West European structures. Due to their currently low
wages and undervalued exchange rates the CEEC are highly specialized in the exports of
labor intensive products. The fear of the CEEC trade’s capture in low wage/low technol-
ogy equilibria, however, does not seem to be justified: the growing role of intra-industry
trade may make it possible to intensify East–West trade without major crowding out of in-
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dustries in the West, and without too extreme specialization of the East on labor intensive
production.
The experience of Spain and other relatively less developed countries’ accession to the
EU suggests that following the accession the CEEC will experience a surge in their service
trade. Much of inward FDI will be attached to services, and the export of services will
need an increase in outward investments. The reorientation of services trade toward the
(old and new) members of the union can also be envisaged.
It is also the Spanish experience that is indicative for the coming cross-border flows
of capital between the CEEC and current EU members. Several factors already attracted
substantial capital to the more stable CEEC; with EU membership the surge of capital
may intensify and the governments and central banks must find the right policy-mix to
utilize the needed external capital beneficially and without threatening macroeconomic
balance.
Agriculture seems to be a problem area for the future accession, particularly because
of the higher importance of agriculture in the CEEC and the rigid system of agricultural
subsidies in the EU. The EU kept its protection strong against East European agricultural
and food exports and there is no clear proposal yet for the incorporation of the CEEC
into the present system of CAP of the EU. Creative solutions and mutual adjustment and
harmonization are needed to change the sensitive area of agriculture to benefit efficiency
and sustain political stability.
The preparation for EU accession will lead to more controlled environmental protec-
tion in Eastern Europe benefitting both these countries and their neighbors. Regulation
is gradually catching up with western patterns, while law enforcement still needs much
improvement in the new framework that lacks the mechanics of the command economy.
Eastern Europe already possesses some advantages that the EU would benefit from: these
are the less wasteful consumption patterns and lifestyles, greater bio-diversity, and more
openness to policy innovations in environmental protection.
The enlargement of the European Union would improve security conditions for both the
old and the new members. It would lead to more controlled migration, harmonized ethnic
relations, coordinated prevention of organized crime and terrorism. The enlargement of
NATO and the EU should be viewed in a common scheme because one enlargement does
not replace the other, but, in various ways, they can support each other.
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APPENDIX I
Program for the Workshop on
Strengths and Advantages of Eastern Europe —
EU’s Net Gains from Accession
IIASA, 5–7 December 1996
Thursday, 5 December
13:30 Opening of the Workshop: Gordon MacDonald, Director, IIASA
13:45 Introduction: Ja´nos Ga´cs
14:00 Latest Developments in the Process of Accession — Updates
. from the Applicant Countries:
. • Czech Republic: Petr Pomezny
. • Hungary: Andra´s Inotai
. • Poland: Ewa Synowiec
. • Slovakia: Igor Kos´ır
. • Slovenia: Marija Adanja
14:30 Questions and Discussion
15:00 Coffee Break
15:30 Consistent Transformation and Integration Policies for an
. Enlarged EU
. Mats Karlsson
15:50 Discussion
SESSION I: Strength Reflected in Trade — Chair: Andra´s Inotai
16:20 Survey of Literature on Net Benefits from the Creation/Expansion
. of Integrations (Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence)
. Ja´nos Ga´cs
16:40 Empirical Experience of Net Benefits of Western Europe from
. Trade with Eastern Europe
. Jarko Fidrmuc
17:00 Discussion
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Friday, 6 December
SESSION I: Strength Reflected in Trade continued
09:30 Service Trade — Trends in the EU After EU 92
. Carlos Martinez
09:50 Discussion
SESSION II: Agrarian Market
10:20 Comparative Costs of Agricultural Production in Eastern
. Europe and EU
. Judit Kiss
10:40 Discussion
11:10 Coffee Break
SESSION III: Investments, Competitiveness
11.40 Capital Flows Related to Integration in the EU and Their
. Effects: The Spanish Experience
. Santiago Ferna´ndez de Lis
12:30 Lunch
14:30 Discussion
15:00 Experiences of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe: Advantages
. and Disadvantages
. Miklo´s Szanyi
15:30 Discussion
16:10 Coffee Break
SESSION IV: Environmental Issues
16:40 Eastern Europe’s Potential Environmental Threat to Europe
. Without and With EU Membership
. Jernej Stritih
17:00 Discussion
Saturday, 7 December
SESSION V: Political and Security Issues
09:30 Panel Discussion: Changing Security Conditions Following the Accession
. Panel Discussion: of Eastern European Countries
. Talks by Stanislav Stach, Istva´n Szo˝nyi, and Antoni Kaminski
10:30 Discussion
11:30 Coffee Break
12:00 Concluding General Discussion
13:00 End of Workshop
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